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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
RNS Services, Inc. ("RNS") petitions for review of an order 
of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission 
("the Commission"). While not contesting the merits of the 
Commission's decision, RNS claims that the Federal Mine 
Safety and Health Administration ("MSHA") lacks 
jurisdiction over its No. 15 Refuse Pile ("the Site") in Barr 
Township, Pennsylvania. In order for jurisdiction to be 
present, the governing statute requires that coal be 
processed at the Site in acts constituting "the work of 
preparing the coal." 30 U.S.C. § 802(I)(1988). RNS contends 
that the MSHA (and the Commission) lack jurisdiction 
because the Site is not one at which "the work of preparing 
the coal" occurs and the material handled at the Site is not 
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pure coal. We conclude that RNS's interpretation of the 
statute is incorrect and we will affirm. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
This is the review of a final order of the Commission. The 
case arises out of two citations issued by the Secretary of 
Labor (acting through the MSHA) to RNS under Title I, 
Section 104(a) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, 
30 U.S.C. § 814(a)("the Act" or "the Mine Act"). The citations 
alleged that RNS failed to record the results of the daily 
examination of the Site, in violation of 30 C.F.R. 
§ 77.1713(c), and failed to have a ground control plan for 
the Site, in violation of the safety standard at 30 C.F.R. 
§ 77.1000. RNS did not contest the facts of the violations as 
cited, but instead challenged the Commission's jurisdiction 
over the Site. RNS asserted that MSHA lacked jurisdiction 
because the Site was not a "mine" as that term is defined 
in Section 3(h)(1) of the Mine Act, 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(1). 
RNS lodged its challenge pursuant to 30 U.S.C. § 815(a). 
 
After conducting an expedited evidentiary hearing 
pursuant to 30 U.S.C. § 815(d), an administrative law judge 
agreed with petitioners. The ALJ held that the Site was not 
a "mine" and, therefore, not subject to MSHA jurisdiction. 
On petition to the Commission for discretionary review 
pursuant to 30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(1)(B), the Commission 
reversed the decision of the ALJ and held that the loading 
and transportation of coal that occurred at the Site were 
sufficient to render the Site a "mine" under 30 U.S.C. § 802. 
RNS petitions for review. 
 
II. 30 U.S.C. Section 802 
 
A. "Work of Preparing the Coal" 
 
The Mine Act explains that "[a] `coal or other mine' means 
an area of land . . . used in . . . the work of preparing the 
coal . . . ." 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(1). Accordingly, a "coal mine" 
is a site at which, inter alia, "the work of preparing the 
coal" usually occurs. 30 U.S.C. § 802(I). The Act delineates 
activities that constitute "the work of preparing the coal": 
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`work of preparing the coal' means the breaking, 
crushing, sizing, cleaning, washing, drying, mixing, 
storing, and loading of bituminous coal, lignite, or 
anthracite, and such other work of preparing such coal 
as is usually done by the operator of the coal mine. 
 
Id. 
 
Turning to the case law, in Pennsylvania Elec. Co. v. 
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Comm'n ("Penelec"), 
we held that "the delivery of raw coal to a coal processing 
facility is an activity within the Mine Act, but not the 
delivery of completely processed coal to the ultimate 
consumer." 969 F.2d 1501, 1504 (3d Cir. 1992)(citing Stroh 
v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Progs., 810 F.2d 61, 64 
(3d Cir. 1987)). See also Hanna v. Director, Office of 
Workers' Comp. Progs., 860 F.2d 88, 92-93 (3d Cir. 1988). 
In Stroh, we found that "shovel[ing coal] into [a] truck, and 
haul[ing] it to independently owned coal processing plants" 
was integral to the work of preparing the coal. Id. at 62. We 
further noted that the loaded coal's subsequent 
transportation over public roads did not alter its status as 
an activity that is part of the work of preparing the coal. Id. 
at 65. 
 
Penelec applied a functional analysis, wherein the 
propriety of Mine Act jurisdiction is determined by the 
nature of the functions that occur at a site. That analysis 
has its roots in Wisor v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. 
Progs., 748 F.2d 176, 178 (3d Cir. 1984), was applied in 
Stroh, 810 F.2d at 64, and has been adopted by the Fourth 
Circuit. See United Energy Servs., Inc. v. Federal Mine 
Safety & Health Admin., 35 F.3d 971, 975 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 
In the instant case, loading, the principal function that 
occurs at the Site, is an activity specifically listed in the Act 
as constituting "the work of preparing the coal." 30 U.S.C. 
§ 802(I). The petitioner asserts that the Commission 
mistakenly made a per se ruling that whenever loading is 
present at a site at which coal is handled, that site is a 
"mine." We do not find that the Commission has made such 
a per se ruling. Instead, the Commission took note that at 
the Site, coal is in fact loaded, at a place regularly used for 
that purpose, in preparation for further processing. The 
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Commission concluded that the plain meaning of the 
statute and the relevant case law made clear that these 
activities were sufficient to render the situs of these 
activities a "mine."1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We hold that the only reasonable interpretation of the Commission's 
holding in the instant case is that MSHA appropriately exercises 
jurisdiction over a location in which coal is loaded in preparation for 
further processing. In its decision, the Commission noted that the 
processing occurred at the Site "[p]ursuant to a long-term contract." 
App. at 524. The Commission also recited the relevant statutory 
language, "as is usually done by the operator of the coal mine." App. at 
527. Further, the Commission framed the key question as "whether the 
few activities that do take place at the No. 15 pile are sufficient to bring 
that site under the jurisdiction of the Mine Act." App. at 528. In 
reviewing the propriety of MSHA jurisdiction, the Commission considered 
only the work that "is usually done by the operator of the coal mine," 
i.e., "loading." App. at 527. In short, the Commission found that a 
limited range of coal-processing activities regularly occurred at the Site. 
App. at 528. To paraphrase National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston and 
Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 420, 112 S.Ct. 1394, 1403 (1992), we believe 
that the Commission's failure to explicitly state in one sentence that the 
MSHA had jurisdiction because "loading" was the activity that "usually 
occurr[ed]" at the Site "does not require a remand under those 
circumstances." 
 
We further note that Justice Frankfurter explained in Securities and 
Exch. Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88, 63 S.Ct. 454, 459 
(1943), that the Court's concern in that case was that federal courts not 
"intrude upon the domain which Congress has exclusively entrusted to 
an administrative agency" in situations where"an order is valid only as 
a determination of policy or judgment which the agency alone is 
authorized to make and which it has not made." In the instant case, no 
factual or other determination that Congress sought to "exclusively 
entrust" to the Commission is being intruded upon by the courts. 
Rather, 30 U.S.C. § 816(a), "Judicial Review of Commission Orders," 
specifically explains that 
 
the court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of the proceeding and the 
questions determined therein, and shall have the power to make 
and enter upon the pleadings, testimony, and proceedings set forth 
in such record a decree affirming, modifying, or setting aside, in 
whole or in part, the order of the Commission and enforcing the same 
to the extent that such order is affirmed or modified. . . . The 
findings of the Commission with respect to questions of fact, if 
supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a 
whole, shall be conclusive. 
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The Commission was cognizant that the coal refuse is 
loaded at the Site for delivery to "the Cambria Co- 
Generation Facility (Cambria) in Ebensburg, Pennsylvania, 
which generates electricity and steam. The material 
supplied by RNS to Cambria is broken and sized at 
Cambria's facility." Op. of the ALJ, RNS App. at 7. The coal 
is delivered from the Site to Cambria, where it is further 
prepared before reaching a form useable by its ultimate 
consumer. The storage and loading of the coal is a critical 
step in the processing of minerals extracted from the earth 
in preparation for their receipt by an end-user, and the 
Mine Act was intended to reach all such activities. 
Moreover, as the Commission noted, we have already 
adjudicated the activities that occur at the Cambria plant 
to be "the work of preparing the coal." Air Products & 
Chemicals, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, Mine Safety and 
Health Admin., 15 F.M.S.H.R.C. 2428 (Dec. 1993), aff'd, 37 
F.3d 1485 (3d Cir. 1994). It follows logically that the 
handling of the coal at the Site in order that it may be 
readied for subsequent processing at Cambria also 
constitutes "the work of preparing the coal." 
 
The list of items indicative of "the work of preparing the 
coal" enumerated in the Mine Act is by no means exclusive. 
This is demonstrated by the additional phrase "and such 
other work of preparing such coal as is usually done by the 
operator of the coal mine." It is noteworthy that this 
sentence does not say, "[work] usually done by the operator 
of a coal mine," as RNS states in its brief. RNS Br. at 15 
(emphasis added). If it did, one might have to compare the 
activities at the alleged coal mine with those of a typical, 
paradigmatic, "usual" coal mine. The sentence as it actually 
appears in the statute, however, does not help RNS. It 
simply explains that the work of the coal mine is the work 
that is usually done in that particular place. The fact that 
the Site is perhaps an unconventional coal mine does not 
defeat its status as a coal mine for the purposes of section 
802. 
 
B. Purity of the Coal 
 
With regard to the issue of whether the mineral 
composite removed from the Site is in fact coal, the ALJ 
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made a factual finding that "[t]esting of material removed 
from the pile indicates that it shows the characteristics of 
coal." Op. of the ALJ, RNS App. at 8. We have no reason to 
believe that the ALJ's findings were clearly erroneous. 
 
In addition, the statute gives no indication that it is 
concerned only with coal in forms that are pure or nearly 
so. The statute regulates "coal or other mines," so it plainly 
is not concerned solely with traditional coal. 30 U.S.C. 
§ 802(h)(1). In Marshall v. Stoudt's Ferry Preparation Co., 
602 F.2d 589, 592 (3d Cir. 1979), we held that the 
operations of a preparation company that separated a low- 
grade fuel from sand and gravel that had been dredged 
from a riverbed came within the Act. It was immaterial that 
the company processed "dredged refuse": "[T]he company's 
process of separating from the dredged refuse a burnable 
product . . . which was then sold as a low-grade fuel," 
placed that work within the definition of "coal preparation" 
and thus made the operation a "mine." Id. 
 
C. "Coal or Other Mine" 
 
In section 802(h)(1), "coal or other mine" is defined 
directly: 
 
(A) an area of land from which minerals are extracted 
in nonliquid form . . . , (B) private ways and roads 
appurtenant to such area, and (C) lands, excavations, 
underground passageways, shafts, slopes, tunnels, and 
workings, structures, facilities, equipment, machines, 
tools, or other property including impoundments, 
retention dams, and tailings ponds, on the surface or 
underground, used in, or to be used in, or resulting 
from, the work of extracting such minerals from their 
natural deposits in nonliquid form, or if in liquid form, 
with workers underground, or used in, or to be used in, 
the milling of such minerals, or the work of preparing 
coal or other minerals, and includes custom coal 
preparation facilities. In making a determination of 
what constitutes mineral milling for purposes of this 
chapter, the Secretary shall give due consideration to 
the convenience of administration resulting from the 
delegation to one Assistant Secretary of all authority 
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with respect to the health and safety of miners 
employed at one physical establishment. 
 
(emphasis added). 
 
We find that this section is so expansively worded as to 
indicate an intention on the part of Congress to authorize 
the Secretary to assert jurisdiction over any lands integral 
to the process of preparing coal for its ultimate consumer.2 
As the Commission noted in its decision reversing the ALJ, 
"[t]he definitions of coal mine and coal preparation in 
sections 3(h) and 3(I) [codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 802(h)(1) and 
(I)] are `broad[,]' `sweeping,' and `expansive.' " RNS App. at 
17 (quoting Stoudt's Ferry, 602 F.2d at 591-92). Since the 
Site was used in preparing the coal for its further 
processing at the Cambria plant, the activity was within the 
sweep of the statute. 
 
The Site seems to be specifically described in the statute 
by such words as "impoundments" (storage facilities), and 
"custom coal preparation facilities," since it serves a 
specialized purpose in a larger coal-processing operation. 
The sweeping inclusion of "lands," "slopes," and "other 
property" further indicates Congress's plain intention that 
the Commission have broad jurisdiction over locations at 
which coal is processed. 
 
Finally, we note that the Site may independently fall 
under the jurisdiction of the MSHA as a "land[ ] . . . 
resulting from[ ] the work of extracting such minerals from 
their natural deposits in nonliquid form . . . ." 30 U.S.C. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The dissent, with its "basement bin" example, overlooks our holding 
(in the instant case and prior cases) that the MSHA has jurisdiction only 
over locations in which, inter alia, coal undergoes processing that 
prepares the coal for its ultimate use. See also Penelec, 969 F.2d at 1504 
("the delivery of completely processed coal to the ultimate consumer" is 
not "an activity within the Mine Act"); Stroh, 810 F.2d at 64 (for 
jurisdiction to attach, the coal at issue must not yet be "a finished 
product in the stream of commerce". For purposes of determining MSHA 
jurisdiction under 30 U.S.C. § 802(i), therefore, the "work of preparing 
such coal as is usually done by the operator of the coal mine" cannot 
include the handling of coal that is in finished form and in the 
possession of its ultimate consumer, as it would be in the dissent's 
"basement bin." 
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§ 802(h)(1). The Secretary has not raised this argument on 
appeal, however, and we leave its adjudication for another 
day. 
 
D. Purposes of the Act 
 
When reading the Act, we are mindful that "[t]he canons 
of statutory construction teach us to construe such 
remedial legislation broadly, so as to effectuate its 
purposes." Stroh, 810 F.2d at 63. As set forth in section 
101, "Congressional findings and declaration of purpose," 
the Mine Act was passed in large part to bolster the powers 
of the federal government to regulate the effects of mining 
operations on health and safety: 
 
Congress declares that-- 
 
(a) the first priority and concern of all in the coal or 
other mining industry must be the safety and health 
of its most precious resource--the miner. . . . 
 
(g) it is the purpose of this chapter (1) . . . to direct 
the . . . Secretary of Labor to develop and promulgate 
improved mandatory health or safety standards to 
protect the health and safety of the Nation's coal or 
other miners; (2) to require that each operator of a 
coal or other mine and every miner in such mine 
comply with such standards . . . . 
 
30 U.S.C. § 801. 
 
Congress was sufficiently concerned about the health and 
safety conditions at mines that, as was stated in Air 
Products, "[u]nder the Mine Act, enforcement is not left to 
the MSHA's discretion. Section 103(a) [codified at 30 U.S.C. 
§ 813(a)] requires the agency to inspect all surface mines in 
their entirety at least twice a year." 15 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 
2436 n.2. (Commissioner Doyle, concurring). 
 
In the instant case, the Commission has legitimate 
concerns about worker safety and health at the Site. True 
potential hazards arise from the fact that part of the Site is 
banked; there are concerns about fire safety and the 
composition and circulation of dust at the Site. Tripping 
and stumbling are additional hazards. Audio Tape of Oral 
 
                                9 
Argument (Jan. 6, 1997)(on file with the Clerk, U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit). 
 
Guided by the declaration of purpose in section 101 and 
the need to read remedial statutes broadly, we do not read 
this statute to be facially ambiguous concerning the 
propriety of the Commission's jurisdiction over the Site. The 
plain meaning of the statute is evident on its face. To upset 
this plain meaning by appealing to an extrinsic source, 
appellants must carry a high burden: "[C]lear statutory 
language place[s] an extraordinarily heavy burden on the 
party who seeks to vary it by reference to legislative 
history." Paskel v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 540, 543 (3d Cir. 
1985). See also Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75, 
105 S.Ct. 479, 482 (1984)("[O]nly the most extraordinary 
showing of contrary intentions" justifies altering the plain 
meaning of a statute.). 
 
Here, a look at the legislative history does not bolster 
appellant's position; on the contrary, it confirms the 
position of the Secretary of Labor. The Senate report 
indicates that a principal reason for passing the Act and 
amending the predecessor Coal Act was to expand 
jurisdiction: 
 
[I]ncluded in the definition of `mine' are lands, 
excavations, shafts, slopes, and other property, 
including impoundments, retention dams, and tailings 
ponds. These latter were not specifically enumerated in 
the definition of mine under the [predecessor] Coal Act. 
It has always been the Committee's express intention 
that these facilities be included in the definition of mine 
and subject to regulation under the Act, and the 
Committee here expressly enumerates these facilities 
within the definition of mine in order to clarify its 
intent. . . . [The Committee is greatly concerned that [at 
the time of a recent accident affecting an unstable 
dam] the scope of the authority of the Bureau of Mines 
. . . was questioned. Finally, the structures on the 
surface or underground, which are used or are to be 
used in or resulting from the preparation of the 
extracted minerals are included in the definition of 
`mine'. The Committee notes that there may be a need 
to resolve jurisdictional conflicts, but it is the 
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Committee's intention that what is considered to be a 
mine and to be regulated under this Act be given the 
broadest possibl[e] interpretation, and it is the intent of 
this Committee that doubts be resolved in favor of 
inclusion of a facility within the coverage of the Act. 
 
S.Rep. No. 95-181, at 14 (1977), reprinted in 1977 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3401, 3414 (emphasis added). 
 
We conclude, therefore, that the legislative history clearly 
shows that expansive jurisdiction was intended. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
It is clear to us that the April 22, 1996, decision of the 
Commission is in accord with the intent of Congress. For 
the foregoing reasons, the Petition for Review of the Order 
of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission 
will be denied. 
 
Costs taxed against petitioner. 
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ALITO, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
As I interpret the decision of the Federal Mine Safety and 
Health Review Commission, it held that RNS was engaged 
in the "work of preparing the coal" at the site in question 
because RNS there performed one of the specific activities 
listed in 30 U.S.C. § 802(i). The majority does not share the 
Commission's view that the mere performance of any listed 
specific activity suffices. Rather, the majority holds that 
RNS was engaged in the "work of preparing the coal" at the 
site because it there performed a listed activity on a regular 
basis. I disagree with both the Commission's and the 
majority's view of the law. But even if the majority's view of 
the law is correct, the rule of SEC v. Chenery, 318 U.S. 80 
(1943), mandates a remand to the Commission. I therefore 
dissent from the majority's denial of review. 
 
I. 
 
The Secretary's exercise of jurisdiction was proper if RNS 
was engaged at the site in "the work of preparing coal." 30 
U.S.C. § 802(h)(1). Title 30 U.S.C. § 802(i) defines the "work 
of preparing the coal" as "the breaking, crushing, sizing, 
cleaning, washing, drying, mixing, storing, and loading of 
bituminous coal, lignite, or anthracite, and such other work 
of preparing such coal as is usually done by the operator of 
the coal mine." It is undisputed that RNS "loaded" coal at 
the site for transportation to the Cambria facility. 
 
In my view, the Commission believed that it was required 
by our decision in Pennsylvania Electric Co. v. FMSHRC, 
969 F.2d 1501 (3d Cir. 1992) ("Penelec"), to hold that RNS 
was engaged in the "work of preparing the coal" at the site 
if RNS performed at the site any of the activities listed in 30 
U.S.C. § 802(i), regardless of the circumstances. The 
Commission held that "[u]nder the functional analysis of 
Penelec, each of the activities listed in [§ 802(i)] subjects 
anyone performing that activity to the jurisdiction of the 
Mine Act . . . ." (App. 18a-19a) (emphases added) (quoting 
Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 
MSHA, 15 FMSHRC 2428, 2435, 1993 WL 525480, aff'd, 
37 F.3d 1485 (3d Cir. 1994) (Table)). The Commission did 
not ask whether RNS loaded coal on one occasion or on a 
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daily basis, or whether such loading was the type of "work 
of preparing such coal as is usually done by the operator of 
the coal mine." The Commission's decision was based solely 
on the fact that RNS loaded coal at the site. Indeed, the 
Commission noted that RNS's activities were "de minimis," 
App. 19a; one of the five members expressly stated that she 
concurred "solely because [she was] constrained to [do so] 
by the opinion" of this court in Penelec (App. 21a); and 
another member "question[ed] the wisdom of MSHA's 
expenditure of scarce government resources to inspect a 
pile of coal waste that has lain dormant for decades where 
the only activities are loading and hauling to a power plant 
for further processing." (App. 19a) 
 
The Commission's belief that anyone who performs any 
listed activity under any circumstances is subject to MSHA 
jurisdiction becomes even clearer when one examines Air 
Products, the case that the Commission quoted in 
articulating its holding in the instant case. See App. 19a. In 
Air Products, the Commission held that a company was 
engaged in "the work of preparing coal" because it 
"perform[ed] some of the coal preparation activities listed in 
[§ 802(i)]." 15 FMSHRC at 2431. One member stated that 
she was constrained to concur by Penelec, which she 
interpreted to mean that "each of the activities listed in 
[§ 802(i)] wherever and by whomever performed and 
irrespective of the nature of the operation, subjects anyone 
performing that activity to the jurisdiction of the Mine Act 
. . . ." Id. at 2435 (emphasis added). A dissenting member 
would have rejected Penelec, which she viewed as holding 
that "a coal consumer becomes a coal preparation facility 
. . . by engaging in any of the activities listed in [§ 802(i)]. 
. . . The Third Circuit's decision in effect requires MSHA to 
inspect all facilities performing any of the coal preparation 
activities listed under [§ 802(i)]." Id. at 2437-38. 
 
As I explain below, I disagree with the Commission's 
interpretation of Penelec. For present purposes, however, 
the important point is that the majority disagrees with the 
Commission's view of the law as well. Rather than holding, 
as the Commission did, that the mere performance of any 
listed activity is sufficient to subject anyone performing it to 
the Mine Act, the majority interprets the "as is usually 
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done" clause to require that such activity "usually occur[ ]" 
at the site in question. Maj. Op. at 3. In the majority's view, 
the "as is usually done" clause "explains that the work of 
the coal mine is the work that is usually done in that 
particular place." Maj. Op. at 6. The majority thus relies on 
the fact that "at the Site, coal is in fact loaded, at a place 
regularly used for that purpose . . . ." Maj. Op. at 4 
(emphasis added). 
 
Whether or not this is the correct interpretation of the "as 
is usually done" clause (I believe it is not), it is not the 
interpretation upon which the Commission relied. As a 
court reviewing the decision of an administrative agency, 
we may not uphold the Commission's decision "on grounds 
other than those relied upon by the agency." National 
Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Boston and Maine Corp., 503 
U.S. 407, 420 (1992) (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 
80, 88 (1943)). If the Commission reached a result that we 
believe to be correct, but relied upon an incorrect view of 
the law in so deciding, we are obligated to remand to allow 
the Commission to reconsider its decision under the correct 
legal standard. E.g., Slaughter v. NLRB, 794 F.2d 120, 128 
(3d Cir. 1986). 
 
Here, in order to escape Chenery, the majority 
mischaracterizes the Commission's decision. The majority 
notes that RNS "asserts that the Commission mistakenly 
made a per se ruling that whenever loading is present at a 
site at which coal is handled, that site is a mine." Maj. Op. 
at 4. This is, in fact, RNS's principal argument. The 
majority then declares that "[w]e do not find that the 
Commission has made such a per se ruling. Instead, the 
Commission took note that at the Site, coal is in fact 
loaded, at a place regularly used for that purpose .. . ." 
Maj. Op. at 4. This is simply wrong: the Commission did 
not even hint that its decision was based to any extent on 
the fact that loading regularly occurred at the site.1 As I 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The majority points out (Maj. Op. at 5 n.1) that the Commission noted 
that RNS had entered into a "long-term contract." It is plainly 
unreasonable to read this passing reference to mean that the 
Commission's decision rested on the fact that loading occurred regularly 
at the site. 
 
                                14 
explained above, the Commission based its decision on the 
bare fact that RNS performed a listed activity at the site. In 
finding MSHA jurisdiction, the Commission gave no 
indication that it believed that anything other than that 
bare fact was required. 
 
I therefore believe that the majority opinion denies RNS's 
petition for a reason not relied upon by the Commission. 
Because this court lacks the power to do what the majority 
has done, I would be obligated to dissent even if I agreed 
with the majority's view of the law.2 
 
II. 
 
In addition to diverging improperly from the 
Commission's rationale, the majority's holding is incorrect 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. This is not a case in which the Commission came to "a conclusion to 
which it was bound to come as a matter of law, albeit for the wrong 
reason." See e.g., United Video, Inc. v. Federal Communications 
Commision, 890 F.2d 1173, 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In order to uphold 
MSHA jurisdiction under the majority's interpretation, a determination 
must be made that loading is "usually" done at the site in question. It 
may well be that loading occurred at the site with some frequency from 
May 1995 through June 16, 1995, when the challenged citations were 
issued, but I cannot say based on the record that the Commission was 
bound to come to the conclusion that loading was an activity "usually" 
done at the site. We do not know for sure what occurred between May 
1995 and June 16, 1995; nor is it clear that the Commission would be 
bound to limit its consideration to this brief period. That the agency 
would most likely reach the same decision on remand is no reason not 
to follow Chenery and its progeny. As we explained in Slaughter: 
 
Where the agency has rested its decision on an unsustainable 
reason, the court should generally reverse and remand even though 
it discerns a possibility, even a strong one, that by another course 
of reasoning the agency might come to the same result. . . . [T]he 
process, even though it may appear wasteful as regards the case at 
hand, is important for the proper execution of the legislative will, 
since proceeding on the right path may require or at least permit the 
agency to make qualifications and exceptions that the wrong one 
would not. 
 
794 F.2d at 128 (quoting Friendly, Chenery Revisited: Reflections on 
Reversal and Remand of Administrative Orders, 1969 Duke L.J. 197, 
222-23). 
 
                                15 
on its own terms. As previously noted, the site at issue was 
a "mine" if RNS was there engaged in "the work of 
preparing coal," 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(1), which is defined to 
mean: 
 
the breaking, crushing, sizing, cleaning, washing, 
drying, mixing, storing, and loading of bituminous coal, 
lignite, or anthracite, and such other work of preparing 
such coal as is usually done by the operator of the coal 
mine. 
 
30 U.S.C. § 802(i). 
 
In interpreting this definition, it is important to decide 
whether the "as is usually done" clause modifies only the 
phrase that it immediately follows ("such other work of 
preparing such coal") or whether it also modifies all of the 
numerous specific activities ("breaking, crushing, sizing," 
etc.) that come before. It seems to me that the most natural 
reading of the language of this provision is that the "as is 
usually done" clause modifies only the phrase"such other 
work of preparing such coal," but this interpretation would 
extend MSHA jurisdiction to unreasonable lengths. For 
example, under this interpretation "storing" coal would 
always constitute the "work of preparing the coal," and 
therefore any site where "storing" occurred (including, 
presumably, any basement with a coal bin) would be a 
"mine" subject to MSHA jurisdiction. The MSHA would be 
required to inspect the basement twice per year (and could 
do so without a warrant). See 30 U.S.C. §§ 813(a), 814(d); 
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981). Such a result 
would, in my view, be "demonstrably at odds" with 
congressional intent. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 
458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982). Indeed, even the Secretary 
acknowledges that MSHA jurisdiction does not extend this 
far. See Sec'y Br. at 12 n.3 ("to establish coal preparation 
activity . . . every . . . activity specifically enumerated in 
[§ 802(i)] must be activity `such as is usually done by the 
operator of a coal mine.' "). See also id. at 13. 
 
In addition, interpreting the "as is usually done" clause 
as modifying only the phrase "such other work of preparing 
the coal" would lead to results that conflict with our prior 
cases. It is well settled in this circuit and elsewhere that 
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"the delivery of completely processed coal to the ultimate 
consumer" does not fall within the Act. Penelec, 969 F.2d at 
1504 (citing Stroh v. Director, OWCP, 810 F.2d 61, 64 (3d 
Cir. 1987)). Accord United Energy Services, Inc. v. Fed. Mine 
Safety & Health Adm., 35 F.3d 971, 975 (4th Cir. 1994). 
But this proposition cannot stand if the mere performance 
of any activity listed in § 802(i) is enough to bring the site 
within MSHA jurisdiction. As noted, "storing" is among the 
specific activities listed, and ultimate consumers who 
receive deliveries of fully processed coal almost always store 
at least some of that coal before burning it. It is noteworthy 
that the Secretary appears to recognize the danger of such 
a conflict. Her brief expressly requests the adoption of a 
rule of law limiting § 802(i) to activities involving coal that 
"has not yet reached a form that is completely processed 
and fully ready for its ultimate use." Sec'y Br. at 24. 
 
For these reasons, I would hold -- contrary to the 
position that the Commission seems to me to have taken in 
its decision in this case -- that, in order to constitute the 
work of preparing coal, any activity listed in 30 U.S.C. 
§ 802(i) must be an activity such "as is usually done by the 
operator of the coal mine." 
 
It is thus important to determine what the "as is usually 
done" clause means. The majority here takes the position 
that the clause means simply that the activity in question 
("breaking, crushing, sizing," etc.) must be an activity that 
is regularly performed at the site. See Maj. Op. at 6 ("The 
sentence [in 30 U.S.C. § 802(i)] simply explains that the 
work of the coal mine is the work that is usually done in 
that particular place."). 
 
I strongly disagree with this interpretation, which was not 
advocated by either party in this case, and is not supported 
by any cited judicial or administrative authority. This 
interpretation again extends MSHA jurisdiction to an 
unreasonable degree that Congress cannot have intended. 
According to the majority's interpretation, any place where 
any activity listed in 30 U.S.C. § 802(i) regularly occurs 
must be a coal mine. Therefore, any place where coal is 
regularly stored must be a coal mine, and consequently the 
basement with the coal bin must be subjected to MSHA 
jurisdiction, provided only that such storage is an activity 
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"that is usually done in that particular place." Maj. Op. at 
6.3 
 
RNS offers a more reasonable interpretation of the "as is 
usually done" clause. RNS contends that "as is usually 
done by the operator of the coal mine" means as is done by 
the typical coal mine operator. Thus, under this 
interpretation, "storing" must be the type of storing that is 
done by the typical coal mine operator -- and not by the 
homeowner with a basement bin. 
 
The majority rejects this argument based on a 
punctilious interpretation of word "the" in the phase 
"operator of the coal mine." 39 U.S.C.§ 802(i) (emphasis 
added). The majority writes: 
 
It is noteworthy that this sentence does not say,[work] 
usually done by the operator of a coal mine, as RNS 
states in its brief. If it did, one might have to compare 
the activities at the alleged coal mine with those of a 
typical, paradigmatic, usual coal mine. The sentence as 
it actually appears in the statute, however, does not 
help RNS. It simply explains that the work of the coal 
mine is the work that is usually done in that particular 
place. The fact that the Site is perhaps an 
unconventional coal mine does not defeat its status as 
a coal mine for the purposes of section 802. 
 
Maj. Op. at 6. (emphasis and emendation in original) 
(citation omitted). 
 
The majority is quick to take RNS to task for changing 
the statutory "the" into an "a," but the majority overlooks 
the fact that RNS has plenty of company. Many cases, 
including several from this court, have written this clause 
with an "a" instead of a "the." See Penelec, 969 F.2d at 
1503; Hanna v. Director, OWCP, 860 F.2d 88, 92 (3d Cir. 
1988); Wisor v. Director, OWCP, 748 F.2d 176, 178 (3d Cir. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The majority states that a basement coal bin is not subject to MSHA 
jurisdiction because "the MSHA has jurisdiction only over locations in 
which, inter alia, coal undergoes processing that prepares the coal for its 
ultimate use." Maj. Op. at 8 n.2. But how the majority can square this 
rule with its interpretation of the "as is usually done" clause is a 
mystery. 
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1984); Fox v. Director, OWCP, 889 F.2d 1037, 1040 (11th 
Cir. 1989); Air Products, 15 FMSHRC at 2431; Penelec, 969 
F.2d at 1509 (Mansmann, J., dissenting) ("the preparation 
at issue must be of a type usually performed by a coal mine 
operator") (citing Secretary of Labor v. Pennsylvania Electric 
Co., 11 FMSHRC 1875, 1880 (1989) and Secretary of Labor 
v. Oliver M. Elam, Jr., Co., 4 FMSHRC 5, 7 (1982)).4 
Moreover, the Secretary's brief in this case treats § 802(i) as 
if it read "a" instead of "the". See Sec'y Br. at 12 n.3 ("Both 
the Secretary and the Commission acknowledge that to 
establish coal preparation activity, loading, like every other 
activity specifically enumerated in [§ 802(i)] must be activity 
`such as is usually done by the operator of a coal mine."); 
id. at 13.5 In addition, the Commission in Air Products 
wrote this provision as "as is usually done by the operator 
of [a] coal mine." 15 FMSHRC at 2430-31 (emendation in 
original). All of these authorities, it seems to me, support 
RNS's interpretation. All of them appear tacitly to 
acknowledge that, although Congress used the word "the," 
its intended meaning would have been more clearly 
expressed had it used the word "a." While this 
interpretation may not be the most literal reading of the 
statutory language, it seems to me to represent the best we 
can do with the unfortunately worded provision that 
confronts us. 
 
Whether RNS's activities in loading the coal and 
transporting it to Cambria are the type of work usually 
done by a coal mine operator is a factual question that the 
Commission has not addressed. I would therefore grant 
RNS's petition for review and remand to allow the 
Commission to decide this question. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In Oliver M. Elam, one of the cases cited by Judge Mansmann in her 
Penelec dissent, the Commission opined that "inherent in the 
determination of whether an operation properly is classified as `mining' 
is an inquiry not only into whether the operation performs one or more 
of the listed work activities, but also into the nature of the operation 
performing such activities." 4 FMSHRC at 7. 
5. While the Secretary's brief does not say so in so many words, her 
unacknowledged changing of the "the" to "a" is consistent with, indeed 
required by, her recognition that the Act does not extend to activities 
involving coal that is "completely processed and fully ready for its 
ultimate use." Sec'y Br. at 24. 
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III. 
 
As explained in Part I, the Commission appears to have 
believed that it was compelled by Penelec to hold as it did. 
I do not think that its view was warranted, and I believe my 
analysis to be consistent with the terse discussion of the 
relevant question in the majority opinion in that case. In 
Penelec, the court held that "the delivery of coal from a 
mine to a processing station via a conveyor constitutes coal 
preparation `usually done by the operator of a coal mine.' " 
969 F.2d at 1503. Thus, contrary to the Commission's 
apparent perception, the Penelec court did utilize the "as is 
usually done" language in its holding. Indeed, it quoted the 
clause as including "a" instead of "the". Moreover, the 
Penelec court was not presented with the question whether 
the statute reaches anyone who performs any listed activity 
under any circumstances. Rather, the head drives at issue 
in Penelec moved raw coal to a processing plant where it 
underwent precisely the type of treatment that would 
constitute coal preparation in the ordinary sense of the 
term. Penelec is thus wholly consistent with the view of the 
"as is usually done" clause as limiting the definition of coal 
preparation to those activities usually done by the operator 
of a coal mine as that term is generally understood. In 
addition, the Penelec court expressly reaffirmed the prior 
statement in Stroh that "the delivery of completely 
processed coal to the ultimate consumer" falls outside the 
statute. Id. at 1504. As I have shown, the Commission's 
reading of Penelec is inconsistent with that proposition. 
 
IV. 
 
Accordingly, I would hold that the Commission made an 
error of law in holding that any person who performs any 
activity listed in § 802(i) under any circumstances is subject 
to the Mine Act. I would hold, in contrast, that the 
definition of the "work of preparing the coal" embraces the 
performance of activities, whether or not listed in § 802(i), 
only if they are the type of work usually done by a coal 
mine operator, as that term is commonly understood. I 
would grant RNS's petition for review and remand to permit 
the Commission to reevaluate this case under that legal 
standard. Even if I am wrong and the correct legal standard 
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 is, as the majority holds, that any person who performs any 
listed activity under any circumstances is subject to the 
Mine Act, so long as he performs such activity on a regular 
basis, I believe it is perfectly clear that the Commission did 
not base its decision on that standard. Therefore, even if 
the majority's view of the law is correct, the proper 
disposition is a remand under Chenery.6 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In addition to my disagreements with the majority discussed in the 
text, I also note that the majority fails to explain or support its 
suggestions that the site might come within the statute as a "custom 
coal preparation facilit[y]," Maj. Op. at 8, or a "land[ ] . . . resulting 
from[ ] the work of extracting such minerals from their natural deposits 
. . . ." Maj. Op. at 8 (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(1)). 
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